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Abstract
The article is devoted to social and political moods of Ukrainian officers in the Russian imperial army in Ukraine. It shows 
the conditions of their condition at the fronts of the First World War on the eve of the February revolution of 1917.
An attempt was made to ascertain the political position of Ukrainian officers, their moods, behavior, social and political 
attitudes in the period of revolutionary events in Ukraine in 1917 and in the first months of establishment of the Ukrainian statehood. 
The article shows the personal officer’s attitude to the change of the political system and the attention is focused on the problem of 
choosing their political path. 
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1. Introduction
During the First World War on the territory of the Ukrainian lands were Russian army, 
which as a result of the February revolution of 1917 became a powerful centre for democratic and 
national liberation movement. A certain percentage of the personnel of the Russian army were 
Ukrainian officers. They were actively included in the revolutionary process, which covered the 
Ukrainian society after the overthrow of the Russian autocracy and quickly became a separate 
element of national military movement. Officers had one of the leading roles in the Ukrainian peo-
ple’s fight for the statehood, because it had brightly pronounced state character, which occupied an 
important place in the process of national revival of Ukraine.
2. Analysis of researches and publications 
The problems of social and political moods of Ukrainian officers during the February rev-
olution are not fully disclosed and represented in fragmentary mentions in the works of Ukrainian 
authors. To this theme a few authors have been approached in different aspects: author [1], in partic-
ular concerning on the first steps in the military building in Ukraine, author [2] wrote on the some 
aspects of relations between Ukrainian officers and government, author [3] particularly with regard 
to the February revolution events at the front, author [4] wrote on the influence of the February 
revolution regarding the officers. 
However, as I remarked, in Ukrainian historiography the specified issue was not a separate ob-
ject. Therefore memories by authors [5–7] and others officers, that were written during the Ukrainian 
revolution 1917–1921, are an important source for illustration of these issues. As well as materials 
from the Central state historical archive in Kyiv, in Lviv, and the State archive of the Lviv region.
3. Aim and objectives of the research
The goal of this study is an attempt to outline the situation of Ukrainian officers before and 
during the February revolution of 1917, the influence of the February revolution of 1917. Moreover, 
the tasks in this article are focused on the highlighting social behaviour, psychology, personal 
moods and choice of political orientation of Ukrainian officers against the background of the revo-
lutionary events in Ukraine through their memoirs.
4. Results of research
With the outbreak of the First World War, on the territory of Ukrainian lands laid 
South-Western front – one of the largest fronts of the Russian army, as well as a small part of 
Romanian front. The composition of South-Western front consisted of 7, 8, 11 and a Separate 
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army. As of March 1, 1917, its personnel were 2 million 281 thousand soldiers, officers and military 
officials. The Ukrainians in it were 1/3, and on the Romanian front 1/4 of its staff. All non-Russian 
contingents on these fronts were 65 % [1].
In general, in the Russian army at the beginning of 1917 were 6 million 798 thousand sol-
diers, and those who were in spare parts – 2 million 260 thousand. Ukrainians was approximately 
3,5 million of this composition. As you can see, the Russian army almost 40 % consisted of the 
Ukrainians [1]. However, only a small percentage of officers belonged to the higher officers, that is, 
before the generals. The middle and lower ranks, which included the Ukrainians, were the basis of 
the officer corps of the Russian imperial army.
Events at the front in early 1917 were unfolding not in favor of the Russian Empire and its 
army. There has been fraternizing with the enemy and defections that have undermined, and so 
weakened the army and threatened to the state. Those events were brightly highlighted in the mem-
oirs by officers, members and contemporaries of the time. Therefore in the army there had been 
indiscipline: in officer’s memory flashed images of the first days of the mobilization of 1914 and the 
“masses of soldiers on active service and in reserve which in the rows went to the front”, Colonel 
Mykola Galagan remembered [5].
Ukrainian Colonel Volodymyr Kedrovskyi pointed out that the situation at the front was 
complex, the food was getting worse every day, and silent protest grew among the officers [6]. 
Besides, General V. Petriv recalled in his “Memoirs” (“Spohady”):
“The whole load based itself on them, on their lives and their health, and reverberation of 
political struggle that went on in political centres for power, forced the officers to ponder over who 
is to blame for all those failures and wasting their lives and come to conclusions only negative about 
the existing order, higher headquarters, and managing leadership” [8].
A centurion (“sotnyk”) of the Ukrainian People’s Republic Army Nykyfor Avramenko with 
this in mind noted that “in the infantry there was a gap and it has become a little dimmed” [7]. And 
soon mostly junior officers “almost openly expressed their views, in solidarity with the soldier: 
when will the war end?” [7]. 
Moreover, among the lower officer ranks in January-February, 1917, according to the reports 
of the head of Volyn provincial gendarmerie management, the spread of illegal organ “the Soldier’s 
journal” (“Soldatskiy Viestnik”), which reported on strikes and massacres in the Empire, took place 
[9]. Therefore, the attitude of the regimental commanders and other officers until the abdication of 
emperor Nicholas II was mostly calm, and as noted by General Vladimir Selivachev, some even 
said directly: “We even knew and were expecting” [10]. 
The orders about the renunciation of the Imperial family and the events in Petrograd were 
received by the troops of the South-Western front very late. In particular, about this Colonel M. Ga-
lagan, mentioned:
“Life went past the orders, but the revolution has carried out its aims and objectives, ahead 
of various official messages that passed all stages of the long military hierarchy and very late 
reached the bottom and efficient army” [5].
But the officers felt that something had happened. For example, V. Kedrovskyi said about 
this: “it is clear that in Petrograd there was something extraordinary. But why we, the army, don’t 
know anything?” [6]. And in spite of this, “there would be no doubt that within a few days the 
whole front learns about the coup, because to hide such an event, of course, nobody can” M. Gal-
agan considered [5].
The news about the abdication of the Emperor Nicholas II from the throne a significant 
portion of officers embraced with great joy. Colonel V. Kedrovskyi focused on the first officer’s 
impression from concerning Emperor’s abdication. In this case he reflected on pages of memoires:
“Finally brought the Newspapers...Hands are shaking, turning its.....True!...we are reading 
the tenth time of the last Manifesto of Nicholas II and tears of joy fill my eyes...Something comes 
up in my throat and pressure in it...I want to run on the street to congratulate all with the holiday of 
freedom...dreams come True!” [6]. 
Nevertheless, soon the revolutionary movement has penetrated different layers of the 
Ukrainian society, in particular the officers and the whole Army. As was mentioned by Volodymyr 
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Simiantsev in his memoirs “the Years of the Cossacks” (“Roky kozakuvannia”) – “Ukraine was 
raging all around” [11].
The revolutionary moods spread on the army and it influenced very negative. The cases of 
desertion were oftentimes, which eventually became a mass phenomenon on the front [12]. Thus, in 
particular General Mikhail Alekseev wrote to the War Minister Alexei Guchkov: “the armies of the 
South-Western and Romanian fronts only with advanced positions at the same time (1–7 April 1917) 
347 soldiers deserted” [4]. Every day discipline has been falling, and culprits of a breach of military 
duty, treated to possible punishments with complete indifference. Therefore, this has led to the weak-
ening of the authority of officers and managers. Some officers were removed from power over their 
subordinates, and the power in the front regiments was placed under the control of soldiers commit-
tees. To restore damaged credibility and to resolve the increasingly growing contradiction was impos-
sible. Consequently, among the officers, their morale was falling more and more [12]. 
During the chaos and disintegration of the army, the Russians more fell under the revolu-
tionary and anarchist influence. Therefore they have been losing morale, but the Ukrainians at that 
time were more stable, and there was a definite Ukrainians officer’s demarcation from Russian 
officers. As Colonel Volodymyr Savchenko considered: “now not only Ukrainian officers, but even 
ordinary soldiers, looked with disdain on their Moscow comrades” [13]. 
In the early days of the revolution, Germany was actively engaged in propaganda, both in 
the rear, through its spies, and on the front under the guise of local truces and fraternization. As a 
result, the soldiers no longer eager to fight, to “prove, as a Russian citizen defends his free Russia” 
[4] and the officers no longer advocated a war to win.
After the fall of the monarchy, the officers began to gather meetings about how to proceed 
further. And among them was the uncertainty about whether right if they were going without 
permission of senior management, and aren’t they violating the discipline. Subsequently, however, 
junior officers, mostly ensigns, who welcomed the fall of the autocracy, became democratically 
minded and were ready to support a democratic system in the state and the army.
Gradually in the attitudes of soldiers and officers had been a great change. The warriors are 
already without the slightest fear widely used the rights of free citizens. Already none thought about 
the illegal meetings or the illegality of the committees, as it was at the beginning of the revolution. On 
the contrary, it was commonplace, sanctioned and confirmed by corresponding official acts.
In general, after the February revolution of 1917, the officers were divided into two cate-
gories. On the one hand, most of them declared themselves to be Democrats. It mainly consisted 
of non-staff officers. The small part of the staff officers also joined it after the revolution, – said 
M. Galagan, “began to adapt for military mass – walked on their hind legs” [5]. On the other hand, 
the second part of cadre officers was in opposition to the institution of new orders in the army, see-
ing in it the lowering of their situation. In particular, personnel officers negatively turned against 
the military Minister, Alexander Guchkov, who issued the Order No. 1 on 1 (14) March 1917. Ac-
cording to that order, the weapon in the military parts should be under the control of company sol-
dier and battalion committees and in no case can be issued to officers. Besides, the order gave civil 
rights to the soldiers, put them on an equal footing with officers outside the service. It cancelled 
bestowal of honour, titles of officers and generals. Officers should respectfully refer to the soldiers 
and greet them by the hand [14].
This order provoked an outrage and concern in the staffs of the armies of the South-Western 
front, and in the headquarters. The staffs quickly announced that decree the fiction and the trick by 
the attackers and threatened with punishment all those who were spreading it. For example, on 6 
March, the staff of VII army published its order, stating:
“According to special announcement by the Minister of justice Kerensky and Chairman of 
the Board of deputies, the order of this is pure fiction and is distributed by evil persons who nothing 
to do with the government and the Board of deputies do not have...in the case of appearance this 
order immediately to convey. Persons, who try to spread the orders, to arrest” [3].
However, the spontaneous revolutionary movement of the Ukrainian officers could easily 
gain the character of the ruins and the mess, as not all officers were willing to support the new 
democratic system in the state and the army. However, as pointed out by M. Galagan, there was a 
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small organized part of the army, which under the leadership of the adherents of the old Imperial 
order, who were officers of higher ranks, could master the situation and return everything to its 
previous state. There existed a certain amount of military who didn’t want to change the order in 
the state. M. Galagan remembered:
“I told colonel...about the revolutionary events and asked to give the appropriate orders. The 
colonel began to prove to me that Russia “not a single day can exist without the Emperor” [5]. 
But not all ventured on a decisive step against the revolution.
With the formation of the first government in Ukraine – the Ukrainian Central Council 
(“Ukrainska Tsentralna Rada”), officers of the highest rank had adopted a new system of govern-
ment, the new Ukrainian government; however, they feared that they would be relieved of com-
mand. Thus, as colonel M. Chebotariv wrote: 
“It were all old people in high ranks...they All spoke Russian, they apologized that do not 
know their native language, because, they said, “You know that we all learned in Russian, etc., 
but at the same time they assured in their greatest loyalty to the Ukrainian authorities, they urged 
that they will try to know their native language. They were afraid to be removed from places they 
occupied” [15].
In the memoirs, M. Galagan states that among the military there were many energetic indi-
viduals in whom quickly evolved just “Ukrainian spontaneity of the senses” (“ukrainska stychiy-
nist’ chuttia”) and mental consciousness of the belonging to Ukrainian nationality. Thus, M. Gal-
agan reflected: “among the last i recall one outstanding officer, company sergeant. Once speaking 
with him, asked him, when he became Ukrainian. He, smiling, replied: “You last year said that I 
had a moustache of the Cossack-Zaporozhets”. I really Zaporozhian Cossack; I am from the Kat-
erynoslav region – right from the Zaporozhian host. It turns out I have long been Ukrainian!” [5]. 
So, again, in these memoirs, that very often mentioned “Ukrainian song was heard everywhere, 
and the Russians also sang Ukrainian songs, often horribly mangling Ukrainian words. All the 
warriors – Ukrainians have been speaking among themselves “differently” – in Ukrainian – and 
it was considered normal. Sometimes elders, adapting to it, in the relations between themselves 
and soldiers of the Ukrainian language used this language or some expressions, not even noticing 
deviation from ascription to use of the Russian language” [5].
On 9 March 1917 the Ukrainian Central Council issued a proclamation “To the Ukrainian 
people”, where called on the peasants, workers, soldiers and intellectuals to remain calm, to join 
political, cultural, economic unions and associations. Ukrainian officers were among the first who 
responded to that appeal. On the same day at a meeting of the officers and soldiers of the Kyiv 
garrison town organized the Ukrainian Constituent Military Council headed by Colonel Mykhailo 
Glynskyi, who demanded from the Temporary government of Russia “will make to Ukraine even 
before the Constituent Assembly the same legal act that has already been published for Finland and 
confirm for the Ukrainian People all rights and liberties” [2].
At the same time was formed the Officers trade Union headed by Colonel Leonid Novosylt-
sev, who defended the professional interests of officers. The Union opposed the Temporary govern-
ment of Russia because it considered its power from the Ukrainian Central Council [8]. However, 
not all officers first recognized the Central Council. In particular, in March 1917 in Kyiv was estab-
lished the all-Russian military Union, which in its appeal to soldiers at the beginning of April 1917, 
recognized that “the Provisional government, to the convocation of the constituent Assembly, is the 
only legitimate and responsible executor of the will of Russia” [16].
Subsequently, a junior and part of senior officers supported the Ukrainian Central Council in 
its first steps, for they hoped to create a strong state and army. It is evidenced by the congratulations, 
which were received in the spring of 1917 from a variety of military units, formations and front. They 
were especially numerous in April 1917, after the Ukrainian National Congress, which the Ukrainian 
Central Council was recognized as a representative body of the Ukrainian people. In particular, the 
4 officers of the cavalry division wrote that they were “waiting for a democratic Republic, indepen-
dent Free Ukraine” [17]. At the same time, the military garrison of Kremianets sent a telegram, which 
stated that at the meeting “accepted very much to welcome the Council in a new composition and 
support it by all means for the aspirations of national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine” [18]. 
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The Ukrainian Central Council, considering the deployment of the Ukrainian movement 
in the army, paid some attention to military affairs. It formed a military commission to coordi-
nate actions of the Ukrainian military movement, which announced the convening of the First all-
Ukrainian military Congress on May 5, 1917. The key point of the Congress was that the officers 
supported the Ukrainian government and has recognized the Ukrainian Central Council as the 
only competent body called upon to resolve all matters relating to the Ukraine [19]. The second all-
Ukrainian military Congress on June 17, 1917 also announced that will provide active and strong 
support of the Central Council in all its activities, and appealed the Ukrainian people to comply 
strictly with its regulations [20].
5. Discussion of the results
The proposed theme of research, particularly with regard officer’s political orientation 
during the the February Revolution of 1917, distinguishes the new aspect of the life and daily life of 
Ukrainian officers within the Revolution of 1917–1921 on the Ukrainian lands.   
The received results continue the scholarly direction of research in the sphere of officer’s 
image, especially in the issues of social behavior and social transformation due to the February 
Revolution of 1917. 
It is necessary to notice, that the investigated problems with regard to the social and political 
challenges, moods will be useful for complement of Ukrainian stratum’s participation in the state 
building of Ukrainian People’s Republic against the backdrop of the revolutionary processes in 
Ukraine in 1917.
6. Conclusions 
To sum up the above discussion, it needs to be stressed that events at the front in late 1916 – 
early 1917 unfolded not in favor of the Russian army, so gradually the officers were beginning to 
experience the inevitable changes. At that time Ukrainian officers anticipated the approach of some 
transforms in the country. Therefore, officer’s relation to the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II and 
the fall of autocracy in the Russian empire were largely peaceful.
However, the explosion of the February revolution of 1917 brought chaos in the empire and 
at the front. As a result, the former Russian army suffered demoralization and was in disintegra-
tion. Officers who lost power had to elect a political way: to support the Ukrainian government, 
the newly formed the Ukrainian Central Council, or to obey the Provisional government of Russia. 
Ukrainian officers after the February revolution of 1917 were divided into two categories. 
Most of them declared themselves to be democrats. The base was not regular officers, who were 
prepared to support a democratic system in the state and the army. The second part of cadre officers 
was in opposition to the installation of new system in the army, to the Charter changes, seeing in it 
a lowering of their status. Advantage won the first category, particularly young Ukrainian officers 
who reacted positively to the fall of autocracy in Russia and support the Ukrainian Central Council. 
They tied their hopes with the creation of the Ukrainian state, and national army. 
In general, the political views of politicians of Central Council and Ukrainian officers co-
incided. They saw the future state structure of the former Russian Empire as a Federal democratic 
Republic, in which Ukraine should be a standalone unit.
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